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A brief theoretical justification for the inclusion of personal contexts
for research in the body of this dissertation

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Adrienne Rich writes that we should
claim the politics of our locations, the contexts we bring to all the
work we do, our various identities that blur and overlap. To neglect to
do this, according to Rich, is to leave out half of the story, to pretend
an argumentative position doesn't have a perspective, a context, and subjective
human prejudices and biases behind it. For Rich the struggle against "lofty
and priviledged abstraction" does two primary things: 1) it keeps
the focus on the particular, the material, to "reconnect our thinking
and speaking with the body of this particular living human individual,
a woman" (213), and 2) it helps guard against the tendency to universalize
ethnocentric positions, to say "all women" (219). Feminist theory
since the time of Rich's 1984 article has moved beyond standpoints and
even the universalizations of identity politics. Identities are seen now
as more fluid, socially constructed, less confining and essentialist.
However some still find value in feminist standpoint theory in the construction
of ethos, which will emerge as a key concept in this dissertation.
Susan Jarratt and Nedra Reynolds write,
Despite
our reservations about some forms of standpoint
theory, we find that collectively, the ideas of place, position, and
standpoint in feminist theory offer us a way of reconceiving ethos as
an ethical political tool--as a way of claiming and taking responsibility
for our positions in the world, for the ways we see, for the places
from which we speak. (Jarratt and Reynolds 52)

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The problem of
ethical-political action in postmodern thought is also addressed by Judith
Butler in "Imitation and Gender Insubordination," framed specifically
in terms of blurring identities and gender categories. Butler would have
us remember that "Gender is a kind of imitation for which there is
no original" (313), but while she makes a compelling argument for
understanding the mimetic social construction of gender and other identities,
she does not completely set to rest the ethical-political problem with
erasing categories of identity. With gay and lesbian identities and standpoints
in particular subject to political erasure by compulsory heterosexuality,
those who would dissolve identities in queer theory run the very real
risk of becoming complicit in their own oppression, an issue Butler touches
on, but does not fully address, even in her more recent work (see "Gender
Trouble" and "Critically Queer").

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Meanwhile the work of Donna Haraway seeks
to develop a guerrilla- like "cyborg consciousness", a loosely
defined hybrid of animal and machine, a hit-and-run ironic turn in the
microcircuit, appropriating the tools of technology for subversive ends.
For Haraway cyborgs are invisible and ubiquitous, "illegitimate offspring
of militarism and patriarchial capitalism, not to mention state socialism"
(153), without loyalties or origins, "committed to partiality, irony,
intimacy, and perversity, it is oppositional, utopian, and completely
without innocence" (151). Haraway dissolves identities even as she
mythologies the multiplicities of the cyborg. According to Haraway identities,
insofar as they are totalizing, are oppressive, and cyborg consciousness
represents a form of subversive liberation from them. In a later essay,
she clarifies a working use for identities within oppositional consciousness
and overlapping locations,
"Feminist embodiment, then, is not about
fixed location in a reified body, female or otherwise, but about nodes
in fields, inflections in orientations, and responsibility for difference
in material-semiotic fields of meaning. . . Feminism loves another science
and technology, the sciences and politics of interpretation, translation,
stuttering, and the partly understood. Above all, rational knowledge
does not pretend to disengagement, to be from everywhere and so nowhere"
(Coyote 23)

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While Haroway's postmodern feminist deconstructions
of identity seem far from Rich's radical feminist desire to avoid the
distances theory abstracts from lived experience by claiming identites,
we can see in both a resistance to universals, to master narratives, ethnocentric
assumptions, through the particularizing of positions, whether localized
and multiple, or unfixable "nodes in fields."

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Moving still farther from Rich and identity
politics, current queer theory and politics has taken as its primary mantra
the desire to "fuck with all the categories," dispensing with
identities altogether, or rather, to constantly "queer" everything.
"To queer" has become the new verb for the undermining of essentialist
identities. In a more recent article Butler writes, "The political
deconstruction of 'queer' ought not to paralyze the use of such terms,
but, ideally, to extend its range, to make us consider at what expense
and for what purposes the terms are used, and through what relations of
power such categories have been wrought" ("Critically Queer"
15).

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But what does this movement away from socially-contingent
identities get us? What does it get me? As we will see in this dissertation,
the public relations positioning of Renaissance Pictures, the people who
create the show "Xena: Warrior Princess," is strongly affected
by the language of the queer movement, perhaps even appropriating it toward
some dubious ends. As I see it, there are a number of ways that the queer
"fucking with the categories" can backfire and become potentially
exploitive of queers, personally and politically, but I'll save that discussion
for another thread in this dissertation.

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Which leaves me to own up to my personal
narratives, my need to tell the stories behind the arguments, the stories
that influenced the evolution of my thought, the identities I carry with
me like so much white, middle class baggage, because even as I learn to
fuck with the categories, a part of me is outraged at the effect of erasing
identities. Part of me sees the move as a form of conscious denial of
identifications that cannot be discarded so easily without deceiving oneself
with a ruse, a pretense, like pretending to hide an elephant under a rug.
It is in this context, then, that I tell my personal story as part of
this dissertation

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